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Antitrust
by Michael-Eric Ross*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Circuit handed down only two antitrust decisions in
1992.1 It was by far the lowest number of antitrust cases in any calendar
year since the court was created in 1981. Nonetheless, both antitrust
opinions last year were solidly reasoned and squarely in line with the current state of antitrust law.
II.

SURVEY

In McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco, Inc.,' several petroleum wholesalers or
"jobbers" sued Mapco, a retailer, in state court for selling gasoline below
cost in violation of the Alabama Motor Fuel Marketing Act
("AMFMA"). s Mapco removed the case to federal court on the basis of
diversity of citizenship and counterclaimed against plaintiffs under the
Sherman Act, 4 the Robinson-Patman Act,5 and state law. The only antitrust issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether the district court
erred in granting summary judgment against Mapco on its counterclaim
that plaintiffs had engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to fix prices by giving Mapco a "Hobson's choice" of either raising its prices or facing vexatious and costly litigation.6
* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida (A.B.,
1971); Harvard University (J.D., 1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia. The opinions expressed in this Article are the personal views of the author.
1. See McCallum v. City of Athens, 976 F.2d 649 (11th Cir. 1992); McGuire Oil Co. v.
Mapco, Inc., 958 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1992).
2. 958 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1992).
3. ALA. COD. §§ 8-22-I to -18 (1984 & Supp. 1992).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. III 1991).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a)-(f) (1988).
6. 958 F.2d at 1555. The district court also granted summary judgment against Mapco
on its Robinson-Patman Act counterclaim, but Mapco did not appeal this ruling. Id. at 1557
n.6.
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The district court found 7 that Mapco lacked standing to assert this
counterclaim because it failed to establish antitrust injurys under the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. U.S.A. Petroleum
Co.' that price fixing "does not cause a competitor antitrust injury unless
it results in predatory [below cost] pricing."10 Accordingly, the district
court did not reach plaintiffs' alternative argument that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protected their allegedly anticompetitive conduct from
antitrust liability." By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit pretermitted the
question of Mapco's antitrust standing 2 and held that plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on its Sherman Act counterclaim by virtue of
Noerr-Penningtonimmunity.' s
The essence of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine is that "the federal antitrust laws do not regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking
anticompetitive action from the government."' Thus, activities that
might otherwise violate the antitrust laws are tolerated under the NoerrPennington doctrine so long as they are directed to obtaining relief from
the government-whether legislative, administrative, or adjudicative.1
The gist of Mapco's Sherman Act counterclaim was that plaintiffs
threatened and initiated litigation against it under the AMFMA for the
purpose of forcing Mapco to raise its prices.1 On its face, therefore, Noerr-Pennington barred this counterclaim."' However, Mapco tried to
7. The district court's opinion is reported at 763 F. Supp. 1103, 1108-09 (S.D. Ala.
1991).
8. Antitrust injury is an indispensable element of antitrust standing. See, e.g., Cargill,
Inc, v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986) ("A showing of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient, to establish [antitrust) standing .... "); Austin v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 903 F.2d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1990) (Antitrust injury is "the touchstone for antitrust standing.").
9. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
10. Id. at 339 (footnote omitted).
11. See 958 F.2d at 1556. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine emanates from the Supreme
Court's decisions in Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127
(1961), and UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and is discussed infra notes 14-21
and accompanying text.
12. 958 F.2d at 1557 n.7.
13. Id. at 1557.
14. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 1354 (1991).
15. See, e.g., Calfornia Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11
(1972) (Nberr-Penningtoncovers attempts to influence judicial and other adjudicatory proceedings); King v. Idaho Funeral Serv. Ass'n, 862 F.2d 744, 745-46 (9th Cir. 1988) (NoerrPennington immunizes complaints to state licensing agency that a competitor was selling
caskets illegally).
16. 958 F.2d at 1558.
17. Id. at 1559.
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avoid this defense' s under the so-called "sham" exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity.:
The "sham" exception applies when anticompetitive behavior "ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to
cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly
with the business relationships of a competitor. 2 0 The exception excludes
from Noerr-Pennington protection "a [competitor] whose activities are
'not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action' at all."21
Mapco contended that plaintiffs' conduct fell within the "sham" exception in that it (i) was in furtherance of an anticompetitive purpose and
(ii) included threats of litigation against Mapco and other competitors.22
The Eleventh Circuit rejected both of these arguments.2 2
Alleging that plaintiffs acted with an anticompetitive purpose did not
help Mapco since "it is axiomatic that actions taken with an anti-competitive purpose or intent remain insulated from antitrust liability under the
Noerr-Penningtondoctrine." 2 If anything, the court was even less recep18. Noerr-Pennington immunity is an affirmative defense. See, e.g., In re Wheat Rail
Freight Rate Antitrust Litigation, 759 F.2d 1305, 1309 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1158 (1986); North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,
666 F.2d 50, 52 (4th Cir. 1981). But see P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP,-ANTITRUST LAW
§ 203.4c, at 56 (Supp. 1992) ("Noerr protection ; . . should not be regarded as an affirmative defense ....

Rather, the antitrust plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the

defendant restrained trade unreasonably, which cannot be done when the restraining action
is that of the government."). Quoting this treatise statement, the Eleventh Circuit held that
Mapco had the burden "to allege facts sufficient to show that Noerr-Penningtonimmunity
did not attach to plaintiffs actions." 958 F.2d at 1558 n.9. It may be that the court meant
only to require that Mapco present on summary judgment evidence of the "sham" exception
to Noerr-Pennington. See id. at 1561 n.12; see also infra notes 19-21 and accompanying
text. If so, the Eleventh Circuit was on firm ground. See, e.g., California Motor Trans., 404
U.S. at 518 (Stewart, J., concurring); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 791 F.2d
288, 292 (4th Cir. 1986).
19. 958 F.2d at 1559. The Supreme Court first applied the sham exception in California
Motor Trans. See 404 U.S. at 513 ("[P]attern of baseless, repetitive claims ... effectively
barring respondents from access to the agencies and courts" would not qualify for NoerrPennington protection).
20. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
21. City of Columbia, 111 S. Ct. at 1354 (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4 (1988)).
22. 958 F.2d at 1559.
23. Id.at 1560.
24. Id. Accord, e.g., Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670; St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Hospital Corp. of
Am., 795 F.2d 948, 955 (l1th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Columbia
Pictures Indus. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, 944 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 1557 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1992) (No. 91-1043), to consider whether a lawsuit
that was found to have probable cause could nevertheless be excluded from Noerr-Pennington under the sham exception if it were brought by a party that "did not honestly
believe that [its] claim was meritorious." 944 F.2d at 1530. The Court answered the question
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tive to Mapco's suggestion that threats of litigation, as opposed to initiation of suit, are outside the ambit of Noerr-Penningtonprotection:
Given that petitioning immunity protects joint litigation, it would be absurd to hold that it does not protect those acts reasonably and normally
attendant upon effective litigation. The litigator should not be protected
only when he strikes without warning. If litigation is in good faith, a token of that sincerity is a warning that it will be commenced in a possible

effort to compromise the dispute.2

Thus, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Mapco had all but conceded
that plaintiffs' lawsuit and related conduct could not be deemed a sham.2 6
Nor was the court persuaded by Mapco's last ditch effort to survive summary judgment on its Sherman Act counterclaim under the Seventh Circuit's decision in Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. National Electrical Contractors Ass'n .17
Premier arose out of a contract between the Association and a union
that required the union to obtain, as part of any collective bargaining
agreement it entered into with an electrical contracting firm not in the
Association, a contribution of one percent of the firm's gross payroll to
the Association's financial fund.2' The Association sued Premier in state
court for refusing to make this contribution. The Association voluntarily
dismissed the action after a federal court ruled that the Association-union
contract was per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Premier
then brought an antitrust suit against the Association seeking to recover
the trebled costs it incurred in defending the state court litigation.2 9 The
Association defended under Noerr-Pennington,but the Seventh Circuit
held that Noerr-Pennington did not apply. 0 The .court reasoned that
Premier based its antitrust claim on the Association-union contract and
"in the negative and [held] that an objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be a sham
regardless of subjective intent." Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., No. 91-1043, 1993 U.S. LEXIS 3121, at *15 (1993). Cf., e.g., In re Burlington Northern,
Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1987) (Litigation that ultimately succeeds can be a sham
if it is "undertaken without a genuine desire for judicial relief as a significant motivating
factor, or if there was no reasonable expectation of judicial relief, or if there was no reasonable basis for party standing."). Even under a purely subjective standard, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Mapco came up short since "[t]here is simply no evidence in the record to
suggest the plaintiffs did not honestly believe that their claims under the AMFMA were
meritorious." 958 F.2d at 1561 n.12.
25. 958 F.2d at 1560 (quoting Coastal States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1367 (5th
Cir. 1983)).

26. Id.
27.
28.
29.
30.

814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 359.
Id. at 359-60.
Id. at 373.

1993]

ANTITRUST

1051

that the Association's state court suit only furnished the measure of
damages.3 1
Mapco argued that its Sherman Act counterclaim was analogous to
Premier's claim.32 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. The court pointed out
that Mapco alleged that plaintiffs' litigative activities were the antitrust
violation, not just the source of antitrust injury.33 Further, unlike in Premier, in which the Association-union contract that the Association attempted to enforce was per se illegal, here plaintiffs had sued Mapco to
enforce the AMFMA-a lawfully enacted statute.' Hence, Mapco's reliance on Premier was wholly misplaced.
In McCallum v.City of Athens, 3 the Eleventh Circuit also affirmed
summary judgment against the antitrust claimant3 Again, an antitrust
exemption was at the heart of its opinion.
Plaintiffs were an individual businessman and an unincorporated association of commercial and residential consumers of treated water in
Clarke County, Georgia.3 7 Plaintiffs alleged that the City had violated
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act by,
respectively, agreeing with the neighboring Oconee County Public Utility
Authority to divide territories and charging nonresidents of the City
225% more than residents for water.3 8 The district court granted summary judgment to the City on plaintiffs' Sherman Act claims under the
"state action" doctrine and on their Robinson-Patman Act claim for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction."
The state action doctrine is largely the flip side of Noerr-Pennington
immunity. 4 Whereas Noerr-Pennington exempts from the antitrust laws
31. Id. at 371-76.
32. 958 F.2d at 1561.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 976 F.2d 649 (11th Cir. 1992).
36. Id. at 650.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 650-51.
39. Id. at 651. The district court converted the City's motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment and, without any discovery by the parties, granted itas to plaintiff's
Sherman Act claims. Id. See Wall v. City of Athens, 663 F. Supp. 747 (M.D. Ga. 1987). The
trial judge certified this ruling for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988),
but the Eleventh Circuit refused to entertain the appeal. 976 F.2d at 651. After discovery,
the district court granted summary judgment to the City-on plaintiff's Robinson-Patman
Act claim as well. Id.
40. See, e.g., City of Columbia, 111 S. Ct. at 1355 ("Parker [v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943), which announced the state action doctrine] and Noerr are complimentary expressions of the principle that the antitrust laws regulate business, not politics; ... [they are]
generally . . .two faces of the same coin.").
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efforts to influence or secure governmental action, 41 state action immunizes private conduct that is (i) undertaken "pursuant to a 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy' to replace competition
with regulation"'4" and (ii) "actively supervised" by the state itself.3
The state action doctrine extends to municipalities. 44 Indeed, the "actively supervised" prong of the test for state action immunity does not
apply to municipalities.45 Instead, a municipality is entitled to state action protection "[olnce it is clear that the state authorization exists" for
the challenged restraint.41

In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire47 the Supreme Court "fully
considered . . . how clearly a state policy must be articulated for a municipality to be able to establish that its anticompetitive activity constitutes state action.""14 The Court declined to require that the state explicitly authorize the specific municipal action in question." Rather, it would
be enough if "[sluch conduct is a foreseeable result" of the regulatory
authority conferred on the municipality by the state.' 0 Moreover, just two
years ago in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,1 the
Court not only expressly confirmed this "foreseeability" standard, 2 but
interpreted it so broadly that the "clear articulation" test will apparently
41. See supra text accompanying notes 14-21.
42. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569 (1984) (quoting Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54 (1982)).
43. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980) (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978));
see also infra note 73.
44. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Executive Town &
Country Serv. v. City of Atlanta, 789 F.2d 1523, 1530 (11th Cir. 1986). Municipalities and
other local governmental entities, local governmental officials and employees "acting in an
official capacity," and private parties engaged in "official action directed by a local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity," are additionally insulated from antitrust damages, albeit not from injunctive relief or attorneys fees, under the
Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988). The City invoked this
legislation in the district court, but the Eleventh Circuit decided the case without having to
determine whether it applied to the facts at hand. 976 F.2d at 651 n.4.
45. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
46. Id.
47. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
48. Id. at 40.
49. Id. at 41-42.
50. Id. at 42. In Town of Hallie the court concluded that Wisconsin statutes authorizing
municipalities to construct and operate sewage systems and to refuse to service unincorporated areas immunized the City of Eau Claire from antitrust liability for refusing to supply
sewage treatnent services to landowners in surrounding towns unless they voted to have
their property annexed and to use the City's sewage collection and transportation services.
Id.
51. 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991).
52. Id. at 1350.
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be met so long as the state has authorized the municipality to regulate
virtually any aspect of the relevant field of business.5s
The Eleventh Circuit consequently had little trouble finding that Georgia's comprehensive legislative scheme authorizing municipalities to construct and operate water systems 4 provided a sufficiently clear expression
of state policy. The state opposes competition among local water suppliers within a single territory to immunize the City's territorial agreement
with the Oconee County Public Utility Authority from Sherman Act liability under the state action doctrine.15 In particular, the court highlighted" the constitutional and statutory provisions empowering municipalities to supply water outside of their city limits "pursuant to
contract"5 7 and expressly declaring that, in exercising the authority
granted to them with respect to waterworks, municipalities "are acting
pursuant to state policy"58 and "shall be immune from antitrust liability
9
to the same degree and extent as enjoyed by the State of Georgia.""
Plaintiffs fared no better on their Robinson-Patman Act claim. The
district court ruled that plaintiffs had failed to establish subject matter
jurisdiction by not demonstrating either that the City sold water at discriminatory prices in interstate commerce or that any of these allegedly
discriminatory sales benefited any competing customer."0 The Eleventh
53. Id. See id. at 1347, 1350 n.4 (South Carolina statute authorizing municipalities to
promulgate zoning regulations over "structures" imbued the City of Columbia with state
action protection to enact and enforce an ordinance that effectively froze out potential competitors of a company that controlled more than 95% of the billboards in the City); see also
Brent S. Kinkade, Note, Municipal Antitrust Immunity After City of Columbia v.Omni
Outdoor Advertising, Inc., III S. Ct. 1344 (1991), 67 WASH. L. REV. 479, 494 (1992) ("Omni's
reliance on [Town of Hallie's] foreseeability standard ... shows that the Court has implicitly abandoned the clear articulation test.").
54. See GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 3(a)(7); O.C.G.A. § 36-34-5 (1987); City of AthensNew Charter § 1-103(a), 1979 Ga. Laws 3770, 3772. Notably, the court accepted the City's
Charter as state law in that it had been adopted by the Georgia General Assembly. 976 F.2d
at 654 n.8.
55. 976 F.2d at 654-55. The Eleventh Circuit regarded Georgia's statutory regime as "remarkably similar" to that in Florida which it held to confer state action immunity over the
activities of municipal waterworks in Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist. v. City of Tallahassee, 788 F.2d 711, 713-14 (11th Cir. 1986), and Auton v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 1009, 1010-11
(l1th Cir. 1986). 976 F.2d at 654-55. See Michael Eric Ross, Antitrust, 38 MERcER L. REv.
1053, 1055-56 (1987). Moreover, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the allegedly
proprietary nature of the City's waterworks removed it from state action immunity. 976
F.2d at 653 n.7 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 541-43
(1985)).
56. 976 F.2d at 655.
57. GA.CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 3(b)(2).
58. O.C.G.A. § 36-65-1 (1987).
59. Id. § 36-65-2.
60. 976 F.2d at 655.
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Circuit affirmed summary judgment against plaintiff for lack of proof of
"in commerce" sales8 without considering the district court's second reason for its decision. '
In contrast to the Sherman Act, which applies to activities "in"or "affecting" interstate commerce to the maximum extent of Congress' constitutional power under the commerce clause,6 2 the Robinson-Patman Act
can only be triggered if at least one of the purchases involved in the alleged discrimination is "incommerce."" Plaintiffs tried to satisfy this jurisdictional element by contending that (i) the City purchased water-purifying chemicals from out-of-state, (ii) its water comes from a river
flowing across state lines,.and (iii) a customer "resold" water that it purchased from the City as ice used for packing chickens to oui-of-state customers. 4 The Eleventh Circuit gave short shrift to each of these
arguments.
First, while the City purchased chlorine and fluoride for treating its
water from out-of-state suppliers, the court held that these chemicals
were merely ingredients of the distinct commodity-treated water-that
was the City's final product." This product transformation defeated
plaintiffs' allegation of interstate commerce since the City sold its Water
only intrastate."
Second, even if the City's waterworks could be characterized as having
some nexus with interstate commerce by drawing its water from a river
that moves across state lines, which the Eleventh Circuit did not accept, 7

61.

Id.

62. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd., v. Pinhas, Ill S. Ct. 1842, 1846 (1991); McLain v.
Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1980).
63. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974); Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1954).
64.

976 F.2d at 656.

65. Id. at 656-57. See, e.g., Bacon v. Texaco, Inc., 503 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975) (interstate purchase of crude oil did not bring subsequent
intrastate sales of gasoline within the Robinson-Patman Act); Scranton Const. Co. v. Litton
Indus. Leasing Corp., 494 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975)
(no Robinson-Patman Act jurisdiction over the intrastate sales of ready-mix concrete even
though its key ingredients, including cement, were purchased from out-of-state suppliers).
66. "The final product that [the City] sells, water, differs significantly from the elemental ingredients purchased in interstate commerce. Undoubtedly, [the City's) customers believe that they are purchasing water, not chlorine and fluoride. [The City] is engaged in the
business of selling treated water, not hydrated chlorine and fluoride." 976 F.2d at 657.
67. I.d. at 658. Cf. Gulf Oil, 419 U.S. at 197-99 (intrastate sales of asphaltic concrete are
not "in commerce" for purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act just because the material was
used for surfacing interstate highway).
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there would at most be an "affect" on interstate commerce. 8 The City
still would not be selling water "in commerce. '' s
Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs' last argument "border[ed]
on the frivolous."' The court disposed of this creative bit of lawyering
simply by observing that "the customer in issue "isin the business of selling fowl, not fluids. [Its) resale of the water, that it purchased from [the
City] is irrelevant to determining whether 7[the City] has engaged in interstate commerce under Robinson-Patman. 1
III.

CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit's antitrust docket in 1992 was the smallest in its
history with only two cases. Both claimants could not get past antitrust
exemptions and lost. Any other results would have been surprising in
light of the reported facts and the controlling authorities.
The new Administration and the Supreme Court's decisions last year in
Eastman-Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.7 and FTC v. Ticor
Title Insurance Co. 7 3 may lead to a marked upswing in antitrust enforce-

ment and litigation. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the Eleventh Circuit's skeletal antitrust workload in 1992 was an aberration or the
most compelling signal yet to antitrust lawyers in this jurisdiction that
they ought to look for another speciality.

68.

976 F.2d at 658. See Gulf Oil, 419 U.S. at 195 ("ITihe jurisdictional requirements of

[the Robinson-Patman Act] cannot be satisfied merely by showing that allegedly anticompetitive acquisitions and activities affect commerce.") (emphasis in original).
69. 976 F.2d at 658.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2083-89 (1992) (in affirming the denial of summary judgment to
Kodak the Court clarified that summary judgment is not any more favored in antitrust cases
than in other litigation and that an equipment manufacturer with a small share of the
equipment market can nonetheless risk antitrust liability by acting improperly to control
the aftermarkets for parts or service of its products).
73. 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2178-80 (1992) (statutory scheme under which states had the power
to review and disapprove fees for title searches and examinations filed jointly by title insurance companies did not meet the "active supervision" prong of the test for state action
immunity, see supra text accompanying note 43, when this potential state participation in
the rate setting process was not realized).

